belief is limited instead by a concern for our ability to effectively consider the space of alternatives to a hypothesis we seek to evaluate and to consider their empirical consequences. Sherri Roush ([2005] ), for example, has argued that assessing the confirmation of a scientific hypothesis requires us to evaluate the likelihood conferred on the evidence we have by the 'catch-all' hypothesis con sisting simply of the negation of the original hypothesis (i.e., the term P(e/-h)), and that assessing this term responsibly is something we are typically if not invariably unable to do in the case of what she calls 'high-level' theories. And I myself ([2001] , [2006] ) have grounded a more general argument against realism in the claim that the historical record of scientific inquiry itself provides us with abundant empirical evidence that there are probably scientifically plausi ble alternatives to even the best contemporary fundamental scientific theories that are equally well-confirmed by the evidence available to us but that simply remain unconceived by contemporary scientists. For both Roush and me, then, it is not claims about unobservable entities or events (at least, not as such) which are insufficiently justified to warrant belief, but instead claims made by scientific theories or hypotheses when we have good reasons to doubt that we have a firm grasp of what the serious scientific alternatives to those hypotheses are and what empirical consequences they have.
As we both acknowledge, however, this general epistemic challenge can be met in a wide variety of cases, including many scientific ones. My simple exam ple ([2006] , p. 32) points out that when we set out to test among the competing hypotheses that per capita alcohol consumption among American high school students has increased, decreased, or remained steady over the last decade, there is simply no room to worry that there are important alternative possi bilities we are failing to consider. And Roush uses a much more sophisticated example to argue convincingly that we are sometimes able to evaluate the like lihood conferred on our evidence by the catch-all hypothesis even for claims concerning unobservable entities and events. As she points out, when a blood test detects the hormones characteristic of the unobservable earliest stages of pregnancy, we know the likelihood conferred on a positive test result both by the hypothesis that the test subject is pregnant and by the negation ofthat same hypothesis: we estimate the likelihood of a positive result when the subject is not actually pregnant in the standard ways that we uncover the rate of false positives for any diagnostic test, by testing random or representative samples of the population at large. Roush and I seem to agree, then, not only that the prob lem of testing a hypothesis against a knowably exhaustive space of alternatives (or of reliably estimating the likelihood conferred on the evidence we have by the catch-all negation of a hypothesis) can be convincingly solved in a variety of scientific contexts, but also that our ability to do so simply cross-classifies the distinction between observables and unobservables that opponents of realism have traditionally regarded as so central.
world and dynamical principles at work in those domains', or more concretely, ' when we theorize about such matters as the constitution of matter itself, the re mote history of the Earth and its inhabitants, the most minute workings of our bodies, and the structure of the farthest reaches of the universe' ([2006] , p. 32).
This would certainly seem to overlap with Roush's estimate of the scope of the problem: she argues that while we have convincingly evaluated the likelihood conferred on our evidence by the negation of a hypothesis 'for hypotheses that go beyond observables, it has been only slightly beyond, and any claim that we have evaluated this term for high-level theories like Quantum Mechanics would be preposterous' ([2005], p. 193) , adding that her analysis shows why 'anti-realists were always right to doubt that we have actually got much further than [confirming claims about observables]; further than that is very hard to get' ([2005], p. 194) . But a closer look reveals that the similarity here is more apparent than real, and that it would be a deep mistake to identify Roush's 'high-level theories' with the products of what I have called 'fundamental theo rizing'. In the final analysis, it turns out that Roush and I remain deeply divided on the question of what sorts of theories or hypotheses are vulnerable to the problem, and we disagree about cases that are central to ongoing disputes concerning scientific realism.
As part of her argument that we should reject philosophically motivated prior restraints on what advances in scientific methodology may be able to accomplish, Roush offers a detailed analysis of a much more dramatic example than pregnancy-testing in which she claims we have indeed managed to confirm hypotheses that go beyond observables: Jean Perrin's efforts near the turn of the twentieth century to confirm the atomic theory of the constitution of matter by a careful experimental investigation of the phenomenon of Brownian mo tion. Thus, while the atomic hypothesis surely falls under the description I give of 'fundamental theorizing', Roush apparently does not regard it as the sort of 'high-level theory' that we are unable to confirm against an exhaustive space of alternative possibilities. Thus, even those of us who agree about the character of the real challenge for scientific realism seem to disagree about where this problem applies or becomes acute, and this crucial residual disagree ment comes perspicuously into focus concerning Roush's central example of the atomic theory of the constitution of matter.
The first task of this paper will be to consider Roush's analysis of this illuminating case. I will argue that she mischaracterizes the example in a number of ways that matter, and that the most important of these illustrate precisely how That is, should we believe a claim about nature if the only reason we can give for doing so is that it is part of or follows from an empirically successful scientific theory? Our concern with this sense of realism will affect the sorts of considerations that we take to be relevant to confirmation in this context. We will insist as a requirement for confirmation, for example, that we be able to justify attributing a relatively high probability to a hypothesis or theory given all the evidence we have and a relatively low probability to the catch-all alternative:
although this is not a requirement for confirmation on any possible account of the matter, it is at least a plausible necessary condition for claiming that we have good reason to believe that the account of some otherwise inaccessible natural domain provided by a theory is actually true. results by the presumption that the modest hypothesis was true, but also the likelihood of the evidence on the negation of the atomic hypothesis as well, and together these form a mutually exclusive and exhaustive set of possibilities.
Perrin and Brownian Motion
But this ability depends absolutely on her further claim that nothing besides an atomic structure for matter could explain a random walk by the Brownian particles.
As we noted above, the argument from the randomness of Brownian motion was far from the whole of Perrin's case for the atomic theory, but it is perhaps reasonable for Roush to search among Perrin's arguments for one with a spe cial probative or dispositive force. As several philosophers have pointed out (see esp. Miller [1987] and Maddy [1997] , [2007] ), Perrin's work converted a large and influential group of working scientists, including trenchant skeptics like Ostwald and Poincar?, from instrumentalism to realism about the atomic theory, but the distinctive varieties of confirmation that philosophers of science have traditionally regarded Perrin's work as conferring on the atomic theory are ones that it was already known to enjoy in substantial degree well before Perrin's famous experiments:
Philosophers of science have reconstructed the case for atoms in a bewil dering variety of ways: atoms are indispensable posits of a theory with simplicity, familiarity of principle, scope, fecundity, conformity with ex perimental tests (Quine); we infer the existence of atoms as the best ex planation of the various phenomena (Harman); the existence of atoms is part of the only plausible explanation of the success of our scientific theories (Boyd); we know atoms exist because they cause observable ef fects (Cartwright). Unfortunately all these general accounts founder on the same rock as Quine's: the atomic hypothesis already enjoyed the pre ferred features by 1900; the Einstein/Perrin evidence 'should have been an anti-climax [...] simply more of the same' (Miller [1987] 1 Roush cannot, of course, mean that the content of the atomic hypothesis is equivalent or close to being equivalent to the randomness of the Brownian motion (which it is supposed to explain). What she seems to have in mind instead is the suggestion that we can freely infer from the truth of truly random Brownian motion to the truth of the atomic hypothesis (as its only possible or plausible explanation), and thus that the demands for convincing confirmation posed by the two hypotheses are in this sense equivalent or nearly so.
on its own to confirm the atomic hypothesis becomes highly suggestive. is moving it about', and notes that it is taken to ground a further inference: 'If a non-living thing is in constant erratic motion, that is a reason to believe it is constantly being moved to and fro by an external agent' (Fine [1991] , pp. 88-9).
But Fine goes on to point out that 'Miller's truism, which in the light of the quantum theory is not true, also was not considered to be true in physics, even prima facie, during the period of concern' ([1991] , pp. 91-2). More concretely, Fine insists that the physics community of the early twentieth century had specific reasons for doubt about the local truism Miller formulates and the associated inferential move from the erratic motion of Brownian particles to the existence of an 'external agent' bouncing them around:
2 A referee for this journal has helpfully pointed out several respects in which Perrin's empirical case was qualitatively novel, though it is not clear to me whether Miller and/or Maddy would count these as 'more of the same' or not. I will not consider the matter further here, as our primary concern is with whether Roush is right to suggest that the randomness of Brownian motion alone sufficed to confirm the atomic theory and did so by ruling out the alternatives without the need to formulate them individually. Of course, if these claims are rejected we must remain open to the possibility that Perrin's results did simply add incrementally to the already impressive support for the atomic theory, but represented a sufficient improvement of quantitative and/or qualitative detail to convince (rightly or wrongly) the erstwhile skeptics.
In the case of Brownian motion, two sources of specific doubt stood in the way, historically, of granting the applicability of the truism, even prima facie. The first has to do with the electro-magnetic view of matter, long the dominant view, and arguably so in the period in question. Of course, the alternative theoretical possibilities Fine notes here serve at least equally well to undermine Roush's claim that '[t]he hypothesis of atoms and molecules is not equivalent to the hypothesis that Brownian motion is fully random, but it is close to being so'. That is, the recognition of serious scientific alternatives to the atomic hypothesis that also confer a high likelihood on Perrin's evidence threaten to turn the razor-thin gap Roush recognizes between the random walk of the Brownian particles and even a modest version of the atomic hypothesis she describes into a yawning chasm instead. It is simply false that 'there do not seem to be any hypotheses that could explain a random walk in the Brownian particles that are not included within this atomic hypothesis'
and historical investigation does not have far to seek in order to uncover at least some of them.
Of course, the bare appeal to 'electrostatic forces' does not immediately or straightforwardly entail random motion of the Brownian particles: this would depend in turn on the characteristics of the electrostatic forces and their interac tion with the exchange medium. Fine is perhaps best thought of as identifying a broad category or class of alternative hypotheses one of whose members plau sibly includes an alternative explanation of truly random Brownian motion that puts electrostatic interactions in the role assigned to particulate collisions by the atomic theory. Moreover, the details of the suggested alternatives will be important: note, for instance, that while such a hypothesis of electrostatic If something is transmitted from one particle to another at a distance, what is its condition after it has left the one particle and before it has reached the other? If this something is the potential energy of two particles, as in Neumann's theory, how are we to conceive this energy as existing in a point of space, coinciding neither with the one particle nor with the other? In fact, whenever energy is transmitted from one body to another in time, there must be a medium or substance in which the energy exists after it leaves one body and before it reaches the other, for energy, as Torricelli remarked, 'is a quintessence of so subtile a nature that it cannot be contained in any vessel except the inmost substance of material things' Hence all these theories lead to the conception of a medium in which the propagation takes place, and if we admit this medium as an hypothesis, I think it ought to occupy a prominent place in our investigations, and that we ought to endeavor to construct a mental representation of all the details of its action, and this has been my constant aim in this treatise. ([1873/1904] Here Maxwell reports that he finds it impossible to conceive of how the wave like propagation of light and electromagnetism could occur without a sub stantival medium in which those waves are propagated. By Roush's lights, this would entitle him to conclude that the likelihood conferred on his evidence by the negation of a 'modest' ethereal hypothesis is very low and that such a substantival medium actually exists. But of course, subsequent scientific history has revealed theoretical possibilities that were simply beyond Maxwell's ability to imagine. Still, it is this very same form of inference on which Roush must rely to reach the conclusion that the likelihood conferred on the randomness of Brownian motion by the negation of the atomic hypothesis is low: she reasons that nothing besides an atomic structure for matter could cause truly random motion in the Brownian particles simply because she cannot conceive of any other way in which truly random motion could be produced.
Of course, Maxwell's appeal to this form of inference is anything but an 6 In addition to the phenomena of thermodynamic expansion and contraction explicitly under discussion in these passages, Lavoisier offered explanations for a variety of thermodynamic phenomena that could not be straightforwardly translated into the terms of the competing 'dynamical' account of heat as motion (see below). Perhaps most important among these were the phenomena of state (solid, liquid, aeriform fluid) and changes in state of matter, which Lavoisier explained by the chemical combination of substances with the caloric fluid. For more details, see Stanford ([2006], pp. 176-9 The point here is not that these thinkers were simply unable to conceive of any possible alternatives to the hypotheses they championed, nor is this claim even true: Lavoisier took very seriously the alternative 'dynamical' account of heat as motion, for example, while Weismann knew that many of his contem poraries embraced the view that the germinal material was reproduced entire and complete in each (somatic) cell of an organism. But in each of these cases we nonetheless find the argument that a particular group or class of phenomena simply cannot be explained except by means of a given hypothesis, which there fore must be accepted. In Maxwell's case this phenomenon was the wavelike propagation of electromagnetism, in Weismann's case it was the differentiation of cells throughout the course of ontogeny, and in Lavoisier's case it was a variety of thermodynamic phenomena prominently including those involving expansion and contraction. In each case we find eminent scientists inferring that the natural world must have a certain structure or contain certain enti ties simply because they cannot conceive of any possible alternative means or mechanism whereby a particular phenomenon or set of phenomena could have been produced. And each of these cases testifies to the unreliability of such inferences in the domain of fundamental scientific theorizing.
In a precisely parallel fashion, Roush argues that nothing but the atomic hypothesis can explain random Brownian motion, and that demonstrating the movement of the Brownian particles to be truly random was therefore tantamount to confirming the atomic hypothesis itself. hypotheses, only a few of which we know how to spell out at any given time.
But we derive empirical predictions from a specific positive account of how some domain of nature works, and an important part of the challenge to real ism posed by the problem of unconceived alternatives is that there seems to be no obvious way for us to formulate collections of such positive proposals that we can have good reason to think exhaust the space of theoretical possibilities.
Robbed of Roush's inference from our inability to conceive of any alternative to a given hypothetical means of producing the evidence we have to the pre diction of a low likelihood of such evidence from the catch-all complement to that hypothesis, it seems that we will not in general be able to responsibly predict anything from the catch-all complements of fundamental theoretical hy potheses. Thus, Roush's perfectly correct claim that Perrin manages to test the hypothesis that Brownian motion is truly random against an exhaustive field of serious alternatives actually serves to illustrate why this will not generally (if ever) be possible in the cases that matter most for the dispute over scientific realism. 
